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InTroducTIon
Canada	 is	 a	 country	 with	 a	 small	 population,	 a	 large	resource	base,	 and	only	one	big	neighbor.	 	Canada’s	influence	 in	 the	post-World	War	II	period	owed	a	 lot	
to	the	role	of	External	Affairs	Minister	Lester	B.	Pearson,	who	
found	a	peaceful	resolution	to	the	Suez	Canal	Crisis.1		The	future	
Prime	Minister	helped	shape	the	world’s	image	of	Canada	as	a	
big,	green	place	populated	by	reasonable,	peace-loving	people.	
Likewise,	the	desire	of	Canada’s	governments	and	its	people	to	
solve	problems	amicably	has	 limited	 the	role	of	 the	courts	 in	
advancing	sustainable	development	in	Canada.		While	the	gov-
ernment	continues	to	view	litigation	as	“un-Canadian,”	citizens	
and	 environmental	 groups	 are	 using	 litigation	 as	 a	means	 to	
protect	the	environment.	Meanwhile,	Canada’s	green	brand	has	
lost	value,	mainly	because	the	government	has	shied	away	from	
environmental	regulation	and	enforcement.
use oF The courTs by The GovernmenT
	We	should	begin	by	saying	that	sustainable	development—
that	is,	development	that	meets	the	needs	of	current	generations	
without	compromising	the	ability	of	future	generations	to	meet	
their	needs—is	achieved	through	standard-setting	and	planning,	
not	litigation.	In	other	words,	judicial	action	can	enforce	compli-
ance	with	plans	(like	land	use	plans)	and	standards	(like	building	
codes),	but	it	cannot	fill	the	void	when	plans	and	standards	are	
missing.
lanD uSe planning
After	 Canada	 became	 the	 first	 industrialized	 country	 to	
ratify	the	United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity	in	
1992,2	it	developed,	but	ultimately	failed	to	put	into	practice,	an	
ecological	land	use	planning	framework3	that	would	provide	a	
degree	of	certainty	to	natural	resource	industries	(for	example,	
mining,	oil	and	gas,	and	forestry).	The	framework	was	intended	
to	help	establish	where	development	would	be	prohibited	and	
where	it	might	be	allowed,	subject	to	intense	coordination	across	
industry	 sectors.	For	example,	 such	coordination	could	mini-
mize	the	overall	impacts	associated	with	expansion	of	the	road	
network	into	wild	areas.4
The	 reason	 for	Canada’s	 relative	 failure	 to	plan	 resource	
development	in	a	sustainable	fashion	lies	in	the	constitutional	
division	of	 legislative	powers	between	 the	provinces	 and	 the	
federal	government.5	The	provinces	own	most	of	 the	 land	 in	
Canada.6	In	that	respect,	the	provinces	still	resemble	the	indi-
vidual	colonies	that	banded	together	to	form	a	compact	in	1867.7	
The	provinces	also	have	exclusive	legislative	authority,	subject	
to	rules	of	federal	paramountcy,	to	legislate	regarding	natural	
resource	development	on	these	“provincial	Crown	lands.”8	In	
principle,	regardless	of	how	poorly	a	province	performs	in	con-
serving	biodiversity	on	 its	 land	base,	 the	 federal	government	
does	not	step	in.	
treatieS
In	 Canada,	 as	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 federal	 govern-
ment	represents	the	country	when	it	comes	to	reporting	on	the	
implementation	of	international	treaties.9	Because	of	their	wide	
ranging	legislative	jurisdiction	under	the	Constitution,	the	prov-
inces	play	a	key	role	in	treaty	implementation.	Thus,	in	regard	
to	the	Biodiversity Convention,	for	example,	while	the	federal	
government	must	report	to	the	international	community	regard-
ing	Canada’s	progress	on	implementation,	there	is	little	the	fed-
eral	government	can	do	to	force	the	provinces	to	achieve	such	
implementation.	Similarly,	the	federal	government	cannot	force	
the	provinces	to	implement	the	North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation	 (“NAAEC”),10	under	which	each	
of	Canada,	the	United	States,	and	Mexico	commit	to	effectively	
enforce	their	environmental	laws.	Only	Alberta,	Manitoba,	and	
Quebec	have	ratified	the	NAAEC,	and	therefore,	Canada	is	only	
accountable	for	those	three	provinces	as	regards	enforcement	of	
provincial	environmental	laws	in	Canada.11
For	all	rules,	there	are	exceptions,	and	the	Migratory Birds 
Convention12	signed	with	the	United	States	in	1916	is	the	excep-
tion	here.	Great	Britain	entered	into	the	Convention	on	behalf	of	
Canada,	and	therefore,	because	of	a	rule	in	the	Canadian	Consti-
tution,	the	federal	government	has	sole	authority	to	implement	
that	treaty.13	Because	birds	are	everywhere,	the	federal	govern-
ment	has	very	broad	power	to	use	the	courts	to	enforce	migra-
tory	bird	protection	legislation	on	provincial	Crown	land	(and	
by	extension	regulate	natural	resource	extractive	industries	that	
operate	there)	but	has	hesitated	to	do	so.
	R. v. HyDRo-Québec
The	decision	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	(“SCC”)	in	
R. v.	Hydro-Québec14	 is	a	 leading	SCC	ruling	on	 the	 federal	
authority	to	legislate	on	environmental	matters,	but	the	decision	
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is	controversial.	In	Hydro-Québec,	 the	SCC	upheld	the	toxics	
provisions	of	the	Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1988 
on	the	basis	that	the	provisions	constituted	a	valid	exercise	of	
the	 federal	 government’s	 constitutional	 authority	 to	 legislate	
criminal	law.15	That	decision,	though	a	victory	for	the	federal	
government,	also	seemed	 to	 tie	 its	hands.	Because	 the	crimi-
nal	 law	power	is	 the	power	to	create	prohibitions	and	impose	
sanctions,	not	the	power	to	create	elaborate	regulatory	schemes,	
some	commentators	argue	that	the	SCC	should	have	upheld	the	
legislation	as	a	valid	exercise	of	the	federal	government’s	con-
stitutional	power	to	make	laws	for	the	“peace,	order	and	good	
government”	of	Canada	(the	“POGG	Power”).16	Had	the	legisla-
tion	been	upheld	under	the	POGG	Power,	the	federal	govern-
ment	would	not	have	been	left	feeling	hampered	in	its	ability	
to	adopt	federal	environmental	regulations,	though	here	again,	
views	differ.17
the common law
There	 is	 no	 common	 law	 requirement	 that	 governments	
enforce	the	law—environmental	or	otherwise.18	There	is	only	
potential	 civil	 liability	 if	 the	 government	 adopts	 an	 enforce-
ment	 policy	 and	 then	 acts	 contrary	 to	 that	 policy,	 causing	
harm.19	Enforcement	policies	 for	 federal	 environmental	 laws	
in	Canada	are	fraught	with	pro-
visions	 that	 make	 prosecution	
highly	 unlikely.	 The	 policies	
identify	 enforcement	 responses	
to	 instances	 of	 suspected	 non-
compliance,	 reserving	 prosecu-
tion	 for	 cases	where	 the	 intent	
to	 commit	 the	 offense	 can	 be	
established,	and	where	harm	 to	
the	environment	is	significant.20	
Because	most	violations	of	envi-
ronmental	 laws	are	unintended,	
and	because	most	violations	do	
not	 have	 major	 environmental	
impacts	 (though	 thousands	 of	
little	violations	by	hapless	vio-
lators	probably	do),	prosecution	
normally	does	not	occur.
the Department of JuStice
While	 a	 department	 such	 as	 Environment	 Canada	 may	
recommend	prosecution	in	certain	cases,	the	decision	to	press	
charges	 is	made	by	 the	Attorney	General	 (the	Department	of	
Justice).21	That	department	has	its	own	rules	for	deciding	which	
cases	will	go	forward.
buDgetS anD politicS
Finally,	budgetary	and	political	concerns	affect	 the	Gov-
ernment’s	use	of	 the	courts	 to	enforce	environmental	 legisla-
tion.	Politicians	decide	whether	to	allocate	human	and	financial	
resources	to	environmental	law	enforcement.	In	Canada,	envi-
ronmental	budgets	have	been	cut	in	successive	rounds	of	pro-
gram	review	every	couple	of	years	since	the	early	1990s.22	With	
most	of	 the	senior	personnel	at	Environment	Canada,	Fisher-
ies	and	Oceans,	and	all	provincial	environmental	departments	
retired	or	preparing	to	retire,	many	posts	have	been	eliminated	
or	left	vacant.23	Because	prosecution	sometimes	results	in	con-
stitutional	challenges	to	the	underlying	legislation24	and	cross-
demands	against	the	Government,	private	firms	must	be	hired	
and	costs	can	quickly	spiral	out	of	control.25	Those	costs	are	
absorbed	by	departments	with	environmental	protection	respon-
sibilities.	Those	departments	normally	choose	to	use	their	scant	
resources	to	focus	on	programs	that	are	assured	to	deliver	some	
benefits	for	the	environment,	rather	than	take	a	risk	with	pro-
tracted	 litigation.26	However,	Canada	 does	 have	 one	 notable	
prosecution	 success	 story.	 In	1993,	Tioxide	Canada	 Inc.	was	
fined	four	million	Canadian	dollars	 for	consistently	failing	 to	
heed	Government	demands	 that	 it	 install	a	system	to	 treat	 its	
toxic	 effluent	 before	 discharging	 it	 into	 the	 Saint	 Lawrence	
River.27
use oF The courTs by cITIzens and 
envIronmenTal Groups
As	explained	above,	governments	in	Canada	have	generally	
not	relied	on	the	courts	to	achieve	sustainable	development.	This	
is	in	part	owed	to	a	failure	to	adopt	a	planning	framework	and	
regulations	 that	 courts	 would	
help	 enforce	 compliance	with.	
That	said,	citizens	and	environ-
mental	groups	have	turned	to	the	
courts	with	some	success,	using	
the	very	limited	regulatory	tools	
at	their	disposal.	These	citizens	
and	environmental	groups	have	
succeeded	when	they	have	used	
the	publicity	that	comes	with	lit-
igation	as	a	high	profile	means	
of	 forcing	 the	 government’s	
hand.	Litigants	 have	 been	 less	
successful	 in	 their	 attempts	 to	
get	 around	 carefully	 worded	
provisions	 in	 environmental	
laws	that	essentially	allow	the	gov-
ernment	to	do	nothing.	Examples	are	provided	below.
 private proSecutionS (FiSHeRieS act)
Under	the	federal	Fisheries Act,	it	is	an	offense	to	disturb	
or	destroy	fish	habitat	and	to	discharge	deleterious	substances	
into	waters	frequented	by	fish.28	Individuals	can	bring	charges	
against	 violators,	 though	 the	 provincial	 or	 federal	 attorneys	
general	can	stay	those	charges	or	take	over	the	prosecution.29	
Private	prosecutions	are	often	stayed.	When	they	have	not	been	
stayed,	however,	private	prosecutions	have	led	to	high	profile	
guilty	verdicts,	notably	against	municipalities.30	Environmental	
scientists	who	were	laid	off	by	governments	have	helped	envi-
ronmental	groups,	such	as	the	Environmental	Bureau	of	Investi-
gation,	gather	evidence	of	Fisheries Act violations.	EcoJustice,	
a	non-governmental	organization,	has	provided	legal	represen-
tation	 for	 environmental	 groups	 seeking	 judicial	 redress	 for	
Enforcement policies for 
federal environmental 
laws in Canada are 
fraught with provisions 
that make prosecution 
highly unlikely
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environmental	wrongs.31	These	groups	document	government	
and	industry	failures	regarding	compliance	with	the	Fisheries 
Act	by	tracking	municipal	effluent	quality	across	the	country,32	
discharges	 from	 pulp	 and	 paper	 mills,	 etc.	 The	 groups	 also	
publish	publicly-available	guides	on	how	 to	 launch	a	private	
prosecution.33
civil SuitS 
Two	interesting	decisions	of	the	SCC	involving	civil	suits	
on	environmental	matters	 are	 summarized	below.34	Here,	we	
will	only	mention	a	civil	suit	provision	in	a	Canadian	environ-
mental	statute.	
Under	the	NAAEC,	Canada	committed	to	provide	environ-
mental	remedies	to	its	citizens.35	The	Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act, 1999	(“CEPA”)	creates	an	“environmental	pro-
tection	action,”	a	civil	suit	that	can	be	launched	by	adult	resi-
dents	of	Canada	against	a	party	alleged	to	have	committed	an	
offense	under	CEPA.36	Provided	 that	 the	alleged	harm	to	 the	
environment	is	significant,	the	plaintiff	may	apply	for	various	
sorts	of	injunctive	relief,	but	not	damages.37	Before	taking	such	
an	action,	the	plaintiff	must	have	first	requested	that	Environ-
ment	Canada	investigate	 the	matter,	and	then	must	have	con-
vinced	a	judge	that	Environment	Canada’s	response	was	either	
too	 slow	or	unreasonable.38	To	
our	knowledge,	no	environmen-
tal	protection	actions	have	been	
brought	since	the	act	came	into	
force.	
JuDicial review
Applications	 for	 judicial	
review	are	 favored	by	environ-
mental	 groups	 in	 Canada	 as	 a	
means	 of	 forcing	 the	 govern-
ment	to	implement	conservation	
statutes	 such	 as	 environmental	
assessment	 or	 endangered	 spe-
cies	 legislation.	 Such	 litigation	
generally	 turns	 on	 an	 analysis	
of	the	administrative	authority’s	
discretion—in	other	words,	does	
the	act	say	“the	Minister	shall”	or	
“the	Minister	may”?	The	SCC	ruling	in	Friends of the Oldman 
River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport)39	is	the	lead-
ing	case	regarding	ministerial	discretion	on	permitting	decisions	
that	trigger	environmental	assessment	requirements.	The	deci-
sion	of	the	SCC	in	that	case	set	in	motion	a	process	that	resulted	
in	the	adoption	of	the	Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
(“CEAA”).40
The	principal	 focus	of	 judicial	 review	applications	under	
CEAA	has	been	the	federal	government’s	reluctance	to	conduct	
wide-ranging	reviews	of	project	environmental	impacts.	Though	
environmental	groups	have	had	some	notable	successes	in	this	
area,41	the	tendency	of	the	Federal	Court	has	been	to	stick	to	the	
plain	language	of	the	act,	which	gives	federal	authorities	broad	
discretion	as	regards	project	and	assessment	“scoping,”	provided	
the	agency	can	establish	that	it	did	not	actively	avoid	applying	
the	law—for	example,	by	relying	on	a	provincial	agency	to	fol-
low	up	on	matters	covered	by	the	federal	legislation.42
	 Environmental	 groups	 have	 been	 somewhat	 successful	
in	using	judicial	review	to	pressure	the	federal	government	to	
develop	recovery	strategies	for	species	listed	under	the	Species 
at Risk Act.43	Here,	the	litigation	has	focused	on	questions,	such	
as	whether	 it	 is	 reasonable	 for	 the	 federal	government	not	 to	
intervene	where	provincial	recovery	actions	are	potentially	inef-
fectual,44	and	whether	the	federal	government	must	identify	(and	
therefore	protect)	the	critical	habitat	of	a	species	as	part	of	the	
development	and	implementation	of	a	recovery	strategy,	along	
with	the	question	of	what	is	the	difference	between	habitat	and	
critical	habitat.45
supreme courT decIsIons
Summarized	below	are	leading	SCC	decisions,	rendered	in	
the	last	decade,	on	matters	related	to	sustainable	development.
the precautionary principle—SpRaytecH
In	Spraytech v. Hudson,46	 the	SCC	decided	 the	constitu-
tionality	of	a	by-law	adopted	by	the	Town	of	Hudson,	Québec,	
banning	the	use	of	cosmetic	pesticides.	Charged	with	using	pes-
ticides	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 by-
law,	Spraytech	moved	 to	 have	
the	 Superior	 Court	 of	 Québec	
declare	 the	 by-law	 inopera-
tive	and	ultra vires the	 town’s	
authority	 because	 it	 conflicted	
with	 the	 provincial	 Pesticides 
Act.47	The	Superior	Court	held,	
and	the	Québec	Court	of	Appeal	
confirmed,	that	Hudson	had	the	
power	 to	 enact	 the	 by-law.48	
The	 SCC	 upheld	 the	 by-law	
because	it	did	not	impose	a	total	
ban	on	 the	use	of	 pesticides.49	
The	by-law	only	prohibited	the	
use	of	pesticides	 in	non-essen-
tial	 cases,	 such	 as	 for	 “purely	
aesthetic	pursuits.”50	
The	SCC’s	decision	in	Spray-
tech appears	to	be	informed	by	a	broad	vision	of	environmental	
law	and	the	role	of	government	in	promoting	the	general	wel-
fare.	For	example,	Justice	L’Heureux	Dubé	began	her	opinion	
by	stating	that	the	context	of	the	case	includes	“the	realization	
that	 our	 common	 future,	 that	 of	 every	Canadian	 community,	
depends	on	a	healthy	environment.”51	The	Court	deferred	to	the	
authority	of	elected	municipal	bodies,	holding	that	courts	should	
not	dictate	to	municipalities	what	is	best	for	their	constituents.52	
The	Court	also	emphasized	that	the	purpose	of	the	by-law	was	in	
line	with	the	precautionary	principle	recognized	in	international	
law,	namely,	that	sustainable	development	policies	“anticipate,	
prevent	and	attack	the	causes	of	environmental	degradation.”53
[C]itizens and 
environmental groups 
have succeeded when they 
have used the publicity 
that comes with litigation 
as a high profile means of 
forcing the government’s 
hand
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the polluter payS principle (clean-up orDerS)—
impeRial oil
In	 Imperial Oil Ltd	v. Quebec (Minister of the Environ-
ment)54	the	SCC	decided	the	legality	of	a	clean-up	order	issued	
by	 the	Quebec	Minister	 of	 the	Environment	 (the	 “Minister”)	
against	Imperial	Oil	(“Imperial”)	under	provincial	polluter-pay	
legislation.	In	the	1980s,	a	real	estate	developer	discovered	oil	
pollution	at	a	former	Imperial	oil	site	on	the	shore	of	the	Saint	
Lawrence	River,	opposite	Quebec	City.	The	 land	was	decon-
taminated	with	the	approval	of	provincial	governmental	authori-
ties	and	houses	were	built,	but	 the	pollution	resurfaced	in	the	
1990s.	Residents	brought	an	action	against	 the	developer,	 the	
town,	Imperial	Oil,	and	the	environment	ministry.55	The	Min-
ister	ordered	 Imperial	 to	carry	out	a	 site	assessment.56	 Impe-
rial	claimed	that	the	Minister	had	a	conflict	of	interest	because	
the	Minister	had	approved	earlier	clean-up	work	and	was	now	
being	sued.	
In	deciding	that	the	Minister	
did	not	have	a	conflict	of	 inter-
est,	the	SCC	held	that	the	Minis-
ter	wears	two	hats,	adjudicative	
and	managerial,	 and	 that	when	
the	Minister	 issued	 the	 assess-
ment	 order	 the	 Minister	 was	
not	adjudicating	but	 rather	per-
forming	 the	Minister’s	 jobs	 of	
implementing	Québec’s	environ-
mental	 protection	 legislation.57	
The	Minister	had	a	political	duty	
to	 address	 the	 contamination	
problem	 and	 “choose	 the	 best	
course	of	action,	from	the	stand-
point	of	the	public	interest.”58	The	SCC	went	beyond	analyzing	
principles	of	administrative	law	when	it	decided	Imperial Oil	by	
also	considering	the	context	of	environmental	protection	legisla-
tion.	As	in	Spraytech,	the	SCC	emphasized	that	Québec	environ-
mental	legislation	is	concerned	not	only	with	safeguarding	the	
environment	of	today,	but	it	is	also	concerned	with	“evidence	of	
an	emerging	sense	of	inter-generational	solidarity	and	acknowl-
edgment	of	an	environmental	debt	to	humanity	and	the	world	of	
tomorrow.”59
the polluter payS principle (claSS actionS)— 
St. lawRence cement
In	 St. Lawrence Cement Inc v. Barrette,60	 residents	 of	
Beauport,	Québec,	instituted	a	class	action	against	St.	Lawrence	
Cement	Inc.	(“SLC”)	for	dust,	odor,	and	noise	nuisances	related	
to	the	operation	of	a	local	cement	plant.	The	residents	based	their	
claim	on	the	general	rules	of	fault-based	civil	liability,	as	well	as	
on	the	good-neighbour	provision	of	the	Québec	Civil	Code.61	
Under	Article	1457	of	the	Civil	Code,	the	claimants	were	
required	to	establish	fault,	damage,	and	causation.62	The	SCC	
reversed	the	Québec	Court	of	Appeal	and	upheld	the	decision	of	
the	trial	judge,	finding	that	SLC	had	not	committed	a	civil	fault	
since	plant	operations	complied	with	applicable	standards.	The	
SCC	also	found	that	Article	976	of	the	Civil	Code	requires	no	
proof	of	fault.63	This	article	reads:	“Neighbours	shall	suffer	the	
normal	neighbourhood	annoyances	that	are	not	beyond	the	limit	
of	tolerance	they	owe	each	other,	according	to	the	nature	or	loca-
tion	of	their	land	or	local	custom.”64
According	to	the	SCC,	conduct	is	not	the	deciding	criterion	
when	 it	 comes	 to	 abnormal	 annoyances	 under	Article	 976.65	
Rather,	liability	is	triggered	when	the	nuisance	becomes	exces-
sive	or	 intolerable.	The	SCC	relied	on	 legal	commentary	and	
precedent	 to	find	 that	Article	976	 required	no	proof	of	 fault,	
but	the	court	also	asserted	that	no-fault	liability	“furthers	envi-
ronmental	protection	objectives”	and	“reinforces	 the	applica-
tion	of	the	polluter-pay	principle,	which	[the]	Court	discussed	
in	[Imperial Oil].”66	Quoting	Imperial Oil,	the	SCC	reinforced	
the	principle	that,	in	order	to	promote	sustainable	development,	
polluters	 should	 be	 liable	 for	 the	 direct	 and	 immediate	 costs	
of	pollution.67
environmental loSS—
canFoR
In	 British Columbia v. 
Canadian Forest Products 
Ltd.,68	 the	 British	 Columbia	
(“BC”)	 government	 sought	 a	
damages	 award	 against	 Cana-
dian	 Forest	 Products	 Ltd.	
(“Canfor”)	 in	 connection	with	
a	 forest	 fire	 that	 burned	 1,491	
hectares	of	forest	in	the	BC	inte-
rior.	Canfor	was	largely	respon-
sible	 for	 the	 fire.69	 The	 BC	
government	sued	in	its	capacity	
as	owner	of	the	land,	that	is,	it	
launched	a	commercial	action	for	the	diminution	of	the	value	
of	timber.70 The	SCC	ruled	that	the	government	could	also	have	
sued	 as	 a	 representative	of	 the	public,	 for	 damages	 resulting	
from	the	environmental	impact	of	the	forest	fire.	
The	SCC	held	 that	as	defender	of	 the	public	 interest,	 the	
government	can	sue	 for	environmental	 loss	based	on	 the	 law	
of	 public	 nuisance.72	 The	 Court	 considered,	 and	 eventually	
dispensed	with,	 the	argument	 that	 in	such	cases,	only	 injunc-
tive	relief	is	available.	First,	it	noted	that	Canadian	courts	have	
not	always	adhered	to	the	narrow	view	that	the	role	of	the	gov-
ernment	in	public	nuisance	is	to	put	a	stop	to	the	activity	that	
constitutes	an	 interference	with	 the	public’s	 rights.73	Second,	
the	Court	indicated	that,	under	the	common	law	of	the	United	
States,	“it	has	long	been	accepted	that	the	state	has	a	common	
law parens patriae	jurisdiction	to	represent	the	collective	inter-
ests	of	the	public.”74	
According	to	the	Court,	the	parens patriae doctrine	has	led	
to	successful	claims	for	monetary	compensation	for	environmen-
tal	damage	in	the	United	States,	and	there	should	be	no	legal	bar-
rier	to	a	government	claim	for	compensation	in	an	action	based	
on	public	nuisance	in	Canada.75	Nonetheless,	the	SCC	refused	
to	assess	and	award	such	damages	because	complete	arguments	
for	such	a	claim	were	not	made	at	the	trial	and	appellate	level.76	
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conclusIon
Neither	the	common	law	nor	Canada’s	environmental	stat-
utes	make	the	government	liable	for	failing	to	enforce	environ-
mental	 laws.	This	makes	it	difficult	for	environmental	groups	
to	require	government	to	improve	its	performance	in	this	area.	
Private	law	is	returning	to	the	fore	as	a	source	of	remedies	for	
citizens	seeking	redress	for	environmental	wrongs.	Until	Canada	
has	a	government	plan	for	sustainable	development,	one	that	is	
translated	into	binding	standards,	the	courts	will	be	of	limited	
assistance.	 Canada’s	 international	 influence	will	 continue	 to	
wane.	
There	 is	 some	 irony	 to	Canada’s	 predicament.	Since	 the	
1950’s,	Canada	has	enjoyed	an	unlikely	place	at	 the	 sides	of	
the	world’s	powerful	countries	because	of	 its	ability	 to	exer-
cise	moral	suasion	effectively.	In	the	1980’s,	when	Canada	and	
the	world	began	to	fully	appreciate	the	need	to	protect	people	
and	 nature	 from	 the	 negative	 effects	 of	 economic	 develop-
ment,	 the	government	 sought	 to	gain	acceptance	of	domestic	
environmental	regulation	by	inviting	stakeholders	to	do	the	right	
thing,	an	approach	that	had	worked	for	Canada	in	international	
relations.	If	only	the	federal	government	could	work	on	a	coop-
erative	basis	with	industry	and	the	provinces	to	achieve	mutually	
beneficial	outcomes,	it	was	thought,	Canada	would	again	shine	
through	its	non-confrontational	approach.	Unfortunately,	after	
twenty	years	of	 industry	 self-regulation,	voluntary	programs,	
and	 federal-provincial	 environmental	 accords,	 the	 country	 is	
nowhere	near	its	goal	of	building	a	sustainable	economy.	
Canada’s	refusal	to	own	up	to	its	shortcomings	has	resulted	
in	Canadian	delegations	being	sidelined	at	global	summits.	In	
all	likelihood,	it	is	not	so	much	the	failure	itself	as	the	refusal	to	
own	up	to	it	that	has	other	countries	riled.	What	they	are	prob-
ably	thinking	is:	if	the	country	with	the	second	largest	land	base	
(and	one	of	the	smallest	populations)	in	the	world	cannot	figure	
out	how	to	meet	the	needs	of	current	generations	without	com-
promising	the	ability	of	future	generations	to	meet	theirs,	then	at	
the	very	least,	we	should	stop	taking	their	advice.
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